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The following topics are briefly discussed:  First,  the different  senses  of  what
counts as phenomenal, and in particular how this might influence how our results
are described; second, the methodological limitations of our original study; and fi-
nally, some ways that the commentary by Mroczko-Wasowicz charts out potential
theoretical advancement of the results we presented in our study.
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1 On the nature of phenomenology
First, as Mroczko-Wasowicz quite rightly points
out, there are different understandings of what
phenomenology is, with concomitant differences
in  what  phenomenal  adaptation might  mean.
The distinction drawn is  between phenomenal
conservatism,  and  phenomenal  liberalism;  the
former being constrained to the vicinity of sens-
ory  features,  and  the  latter  including  various
cognitive phenomena, such as expectations and
associations, among others.
We chose to use the term in the more re-
strictive sense for a number of reasons. First, as
the more restrictive of the two, it is less contro-
versial  that  what  is  included counts  as  genu-
inely phenomenological. Second, in many circles
at  least,  the  more  restrictive  understanding
seems  to  be  what  people  generally  have  in
mind.  The  more  liberal  understanding  is  one
that  is  endorsed  more  commonly only  among
specialists. 
What I am about to say may be a matter
of splitting hairs – and so I ask for forgiveness
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in  advance.  I  am in complete agreement that
the distinction is a valuable one to make, and
that in our original article we just ran with the
more restrictive definition. That said, it doesn’t
seem to me that with this distinction in hand
one  is  raising  “alternative  interpretations”  of
our results; rather one is providing a different
way of describing the same result. On a conser-
vative definition of what counts as phenomenal,
we did not find phenomenal adaptation. But if
one adopts a liberal understanding of the term
that includes various cognitive phenomena, then
it would be correct to say that we did, in fact,
find some phenomenal  adaptation. So long as
there is clarity on what exactly was found, and
on how one intends to use the key terms, then
this shouldn’t be cause for confusion or concern.
Where things could get interesting would
be on a possible third way to understand phe-
nomenal – call it the radical understanding. On
the radical view, there is nothing to phenomen-
ology other than the sort of cognitive phenom-
ena that the liberal view intended to add to the
more narrowly sensory understanding. For one
who holds such a view, we may very well have
found the beginnings of phenomenal adaptation
tout court when we found the beginnings of ele-
ments of cognitive adaptation.
This  hairsplitting  aside,  I  couldn’t  agree
more with Mroczko-Wasowicz’s point that when
getting  into  the  details  of  discussions  about
phenomenal  adaptation,  a  solid  understanding
of the different ways that the key terms might
be  understood  is  crucially  important,  and  in
this respect her commentary is an excellent sup-
plement to the discussion we provided.
2 On methodological limitations
Mroczko-Wasowicz goes on to, quite reasonably,
point to some of the shortcomings of our pilot
study.  In fact,  we pointed out  many of  these
same shortcomings ourselves. There are a couple
however  that  are  worth  saying  at  least  a  bit
about.
Mroczko-Wasowicz points out that some of
our findings are based on subjective report, and
that there are “doubts about whether subjective
reports are trustworthy.” While in general this is
entirely correct, there is a sense of phenomenal
adaptation  according  to  which  what  we  were
studying is precisely  how things would seem to
the subject. It is undoubtedly the case that even
in  such situations  one  is  not  limited to what
subjective report might have to say on the mat-
ter.  Indeed,  this  is  among the reasons we in-
cluded other  experiments  as  part  of  the  pro-
tocol. But the phenomenon that I  subjectively
notice and can report on when I adapt to the
spatial distortion of new corrective glasses, or to
the color distortion of blue-blocking sunglasses
is an interesting one, and one might reasonably
wonder if one can get an analogous adaptation
effect – the same subjectively noticeable and re-
portable effect – with respect to rotated colors.
This is related to a second point. Mroczko-
Wasowicz echoes our claim that it is  a short-
coming of the study that the researchers them-
selves were subjects. Surely it is the case that
knowledge of the experiment and the phenom-
ena to be studied can bias the results. Of course
I agree completely with that.
Nevertheless, I am reminded of a point made
in conversation by Vilayanur Ramachandran. In a
moment of venting about some objections made to
some of his results, he hypothesized that he could
show psychologists a talking pig and they would
scoff that it was an n of 1.
In the present case, it is true that having
the experimenters themselves be subjects effects
the results. But even so, if it turned out that I
or the other subject JK did end up in a state
that seemed to us to be one of phenomenal ad-
aptation,  then  this  would  still  be  interesting,
because  if  nothing  else  it  would  demonstrate
that we could get the effect in anyone if we just
briefed them on the experiment beforehand. If I
hypothesize  that  hitting  myself  on  the  head
three times with a baguette will make me able
to speak fluent French, and I do the experiment
and it does, this is an interesting result even if I
was both experimenter and subject.
In any case, Mroczko-Wasowicz and I are
in a great deal of agreement about the limita-
tions created by the methodology of our pilot
study,  and  these  limitations  need  to  be  kept
firmly in mind when anyone ventures to inter-
pret our findings or follow up on them.
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3 Advancing the debate
The  final  set  of  points  made  by  Mroczko-
Wasowicz concerns synesthesia, and in particu-
lar how the phenomenon presents an interesting
complement to the sort of phenomenon we stud-
ied. When we were initially brainstorming the
experiment we discussed what might happen if
a synesthete were to wear the rotation gear. But
that  line  of  speculation  never  got  past  the
brainstorming  stage,  since  just  doing  it  with
ourselves proved enough of a challenge. While it
has  some  significant  differences  from  synes-
thesia, we did make an attempt to see whether
the  McCollough  effect  would  adapt.  But  the
subjective effect was very small, and didn’t last
long enough into the protocol to get any data at
the time when there might have been some ad-
aptation.
Mroczko-Wasowicz makes some fascinating
points  about  how  our  study  and  synesthesia
complement each other in interesting way that
would be strong motivation for anyone following
up on our study to try to include some synes-
thetes among the test subjects.
4 Conclusion
We tried to make our initial article streamlined
and not burdened with too much detailed theor-
etical discussion. Since we hope the interested
parties  will  include  not  only philosophers  but
also psychologists  and cognitive scientists,  the
thought was  to present  the  results,  which  we
thought were quite  interesting and suggestive,
and leave the more detailed theoretical discus-
sions and possible follow-up experiments to oth-
ers.  In  this  respect  Mroczko-Wasowicz’s  com-
mentary is exactly the sort of detailed theoret-
ical  follow-up  we  hoped  others  might  be  in-
spired to produce on the basis of our results. I
am grateful to her for fantastic commentary.
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